Abstract. In enterprise information systems, personal mobility provides the ability for roaming users to access enterprise network services from anywhere at anytime. However, methods for mutual authentication between roaming user and servers are still far from satisfied. In this paper, we focus on such a mutual authentication scheme, by which users can only use memorable information to log in servers with confidence. The scheme is designed in a threshold fashion to improve system's availability and robustness. It can resist known attacks, such as replay attack, password guessing attack and verifier stolen attack. We believe this scheme is suitable for enterprise computing scenarios, in which network environments are confidential and closed.
INTRODUCTION
Personal mobility provides the ability for roaming users to access proper network service at anytime, from anywhere. This problem is of growing importance as Internet-enabled computing devices become ever more prevalent and versatile. A common scenario in enterprise information systems is described as follows: a big enterprise with many departments possesses sufficient numbers and abundant variety of computing devices for its employees; each employee belongs to one particular department and has rights of accessing to dedicated services provided by that department; an employee can log in his or her department's network from any of these devices using one enterprise-wide unique interface.
One crucial issue of above scenario is mutual authentication between the employee and his or her department's network. This would be straightforward if users can only use memorable information, such as names and passwords, to complete mutual authentication. However, memorable passwords are very susceptible to exhaustive search or dictionary attacks [1] [2] [3] .
In this paper, we propose a new threshold password-and-names-based mutual authentication scheme for roaming users. The proposed scheme is based on elliptic curve cryptography [4] . Password is used for authenticating user to servers in a threshold fashion [5] , and identity-based cryptography techniques [6] is used to solve the problem of authenticating servers to user. The roaming user can achieve mutual authentication with his or her department's networks by only keeping three pieces of information in mind. They are his or her user name, relative password and his or her department's name. We assume all these pieces of information are memorable, since two names are familiar to users, and password can be weak and short.
PROPOSED SCHEME
There are four kinds of entities in proposed scheme, namely the dealer, the server, the client and the user. The scheme consists of mainly three phases: the setup phase, the registration phase and the authentication phase. For reader's convenience, we first list the notations used in our scheme in Table 1 . Dealer has the responsibility for initializing enterprise-wide parameters and then distributing them. Servers respond to user's request and verify its validity distributedly. At meanwhile, every server involved in authentication phase should authenticate itself to the user too. Each server has a name in format of {department name || ID}, where "||" means concatenation. The registered user can accomplish mutual authentication with department's servers in authentication phase. Note that s is the one and only one enterprise-wide secret. On the contrary, there should be several different r s, each for one particular department. We will demonstrate later that s is used in authenticating servers while r is used in authenticating users.
Detailed Scheme

Setup Phase
In setup phase, the enterprise's dealer E is in charge of initializing enterprise-wide parameters and generating the secrets stored in every server.
Step 1: E randomly chooses a number If there is another department, E repeat the process in step 2 and step 3 to initialize secrets for its servers.
Registration Phase
In order to get registration to department D , user U first chooses a password U P , which is easy to memorize, and then sends it with his or her username U N secretly to We can see later that after the authentication phase, it can be used to derive a secure session key between U and i S .
Authentication Phase
We assume the network between client terminal C and servers of D is insecure. The user U roams up to C and wants to get mutual authentication with D . The method U used to accomplish such an authentication is to provide three pieces of memorable information: the department's name D N , his or her username U N and his or her password U P . The dealer E can be offline in this phase.
Step to C as a reply, in which i ID is the arbitrary unique string assigned to i S in the setup phase.
Step 3: On receiving replies with the proper nonce from these t servers, C first rebuilds the public key 
